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The bankruptcy of the famed Enron Corporation was not only a seminal business event, as such a large
and well-positioned company rarely fails, but also a watershed event in American corporate law and
governance that has inspired numerous reforms in the corporate legal and regulatory regimes. The key
question, critical to understanding the reforms demanded and enacted, is why did this company
collapse? More specifically, who is responsible for this failure, and what could have been done to
avoid it?
A number of commentators in this Symposium have concentrated on the failures of the gatekeepers-objective monitors such as the auditors, rating agencies, and investment analysts--who may have
acquiesced in, done little to prevent, or even missed the problematic management activities that led to
Enron's collapse. [FN1] These commentators have suggested that reform targeting the conduct and
structure of these gatekeepers is necessary both to prevent a repeat of Enron and to restore public
confidence in our financial markets. [FN2] I cannot quibble with much of this argument. Clearly, these
"gatekeepers" or "objective monitors," as Professors Coffee and Macey alternately describe them,
[FN3] failed miserably in their responsibilities. They were either incredibly negligent or sufficiently
co-opted by Enron's management that they lost all objectivity and efficacy.
While I agree with my colleagues as to the nature of the problem, I disagree as to precisely where the
focus of reform should lie. For instance, Professor Macey explores what he believes is a tradeoff
between proximity and objectivity. [FN4] His premise is that directors who *497 are in close proximity
to corporate management cannot be truly objective. [FN5] The implication is that reformers must focus
on the objectivity of those who are not proximate--the outside monitors [FN6] I cannot accept this
premise. I believe that while active, nonproximate monitors may be helpful, the real key to the
prevention of Enron-type scandals centers on the proximate monitors, namely, the company's directors.
As corporate insiders, they are in the best position to observe the activities of corporate management.
The secret lies in making them more objective and engaged monitors.
An examination of classical corporate governance theory is helpful in understanding how directors can
be made more objective and engaged. Under traditional theory, the board acts as an active management
monitor for shareholder benefit. [FN7] Not only must the board decide when to engage and when to
terminate a management team, but it must also oversee and review management activity between these
two points. The goal of board oversight is to make company management accountable and, thus, more
effective. [FN8]
The concepts of independence and equity are central to active monitoring. [FN9] To fulfill their
oversight responsibilities effectively, directors must be independent of management and must hold a
personally meaningful equity stake in the enterprise. [FN10] Independence involves the absence of any
economic ties, either to management or to the company itself, other than equity ownership. It provides
a director with the distance and objectivity necessary to examine management action in the most
effective manner. [FN11] Economic relationships *498 with management, including consulting,
service provision, or other indirect arrangements, may cloud a director's judgment and make it more
difficult to review management conduct objectively. [FN12] A lack of independence can lead to
ineffective monitoring if, for example, it makes a director too comfortable with management and its
representations or places her in such a close relationship with management that she cannot effectively
disengage herself in order to review management conduct objectively. Keeping directors distanced
from company management allows them to conduct the reflective review of management practices that
public shareholders expect and that is necessary to long-term corporate success.
Director independence is also important because of its impact on management activity. Insofar as
management is concerned, director independence brings accountability and responsibility.
Responsibility to a watchful intermediary will likely spur thoughtful decisionmaking and reflection on

management's part. [FN13] These results will not occur unless the intermediary is in fact independent
of the examined party, [FN14] thus making board independence a critical component of modern
governance theory.
Coincident and complementary to its emphasis on director independence, modern corporate
governance theory also stresses the need for directors to hold an equity stake in the corporation.
[FN15] While director independence promotes objectivity, the requirement that board members
maintain equity ownership in the corporation gives the directors an incentive to exercise their
objectivity effectively. [FN16] When management appoints the board of directors, and these directors
have no stake in the corporate enterprise other than their board seats, the directors simply have no
pecuniary incentive to actively monitor management. [FN17] When directors shirk their duty to
monitor management, stockholder interests are left unprotected. The most effective incentive for
directors to address their responsibilities to the shareholders is to make them stockholders as well.
[FN18] By becoming equity *499 holders, the outside directors assume a personal stake in the success
or failure of the enterprise.
Of course, when stock ownership is insubstantial in comparison to the other private benefits associated
with being a director, the motivational impact is bound to be minimal. For example, while the outside
directors of many large corporations often have a nominal equity stake in the company, they typically
receive far more substantial compensation in the form of annual fees. [FN19]] Such a compensation
system is a wholly inadequate way to provide the kinds of personal incentives necessary to create an
active board. The best way to align director and shareholder interests and to promote effective
monitoring is to pay director fees primarily in the form of restricted company stock.
It is important to note that while equity ownership provides the incentive to monitor, it alone does not
provide the proper objectivity to foster effective oversight. Independence creates this objectivity, and
that is why modern governance theory demands both equity ownership and independence. Independent
directors without equity ownership may be objective, but they have little incentive to engage in active
oversight. Equity ownership provides the incentive to exercise objective oversight. On the other hand,
equity-holding directors who are not independent may have the proper incentive but lack the necessary
objectivity. Independence and equity ownership, acting in tandem, are the keys to effective corporate
governance.
But how does this emphasis on director independence and equity relate to the board failure at Enron?
The answer is straightforward: the Enron directors lacked independence from management. [FN20]
They may have held company equity, but without the appropriate independence from Enron
management, they lacked the objectivity needed to perceive the numerous and significant warning
signs that should have alerted them to the alleged management malfeasance that led to the company's
ultimate meltdown and failure.
Five specific signals should have induced greater board probing of management initiatives. Of these
signals, the primary two concerned *500 management's activities. The first involved management's
request, on two specific occasions, that the board waive the company's code of ethics prohibiting
officer conflict-of-interest transactions. [FN21] The now infamous waivers allowed the debt-shifting,
off-balance-sheet transactions that were allegedly designed to mask the company's precarious financial
situation. [FN22] The second warning signal involved massive sales of company stock by numerous
high-level insiders. [FN23] Management stock sales are never viewed as a good sign of the company's
future prospects, [FN24] and they should have alerted the board to potential problems.
The third, fourth, and fifth signals involved the company's auditors, Arthur Andersen. Enron initially
engaged Andersen as its external auditor. However, this role expanded dramatically over time.
Operating in a climate in which numerous authorities, including the Chairman of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, were calling for substantial reform of the auditor/company relationship,
Enron's relationship with Andersen was problematic in several respects. First, in addition to providing

external auditing services, Andersen also served as the company's internal auditor. [FN25] Using a
single company to execute both the internal and external audits generally encountered great criticism,
as many thought that comingling these two oversight responsibilities would compromise the
effectiveness of each. [FN26] Second, while acting as the company's auditor, Andersen provided
substantial consulting services to Enron. [FN27] In 2001 alone, Andersen billed approximately $27
million just for its consulting activities. [FN28] By this time, this sort of auditor/client consulting
relationship was coming under increasing attack, as critics argued that it would compromise audits.
[FN29] Finally, senior members of the Enron finance department *501 had been hired directly from
Arthur Andersen. [FN30] This practice was problematic as well because the relationship between
former and present firm employees had the potential to create unwelcome pressure on the external
auditor. [FN31]
It is difficult to conceive how the highly respected, intelligent, and influential Enron board could have
missed all five of these warning signals. Had the directors asked questions about these actions, they
might have been able to discover and respond to the management misdeeds that hastened the
company's collapse. What went wrong? Simply stated, the directors lacked the appropriate
independence from management. As a result, they did not have the objectivity to appreciate the
severity of the warnings they were receiving, and they became ineffective proximate monitors. Despite
the fact that they were technically outsiders and not full-time company employees, a large number of
Enron directors still had numerous financial or quasi-financial relationships with the company and its
management. For example, several directors had direct consulting relationships with the company for
which they were well compensated. [FN32] Others were officers of charitable organizations that were
the beneficiaries of significant donations from either Enron itself or members of company
management. [FN33] Still others had business dealings with the company. [FN34] A few had been
directors for so many years that their board seats appeared to have become company-sponsored
sinecures. [FN35] Interestingly enough, most of these directors would have been considered
independent under then-existing Securities and Exchange Commission or New York Stock Exchange
requirements. [FN36]
However, these directors were not in fact independent, at least not in the sense that corporate
governance theorists would consider appropriate. Most theorists would consider an independent
director to be someone who has no significant direct or indirect financial relationships with the
company or its management. [FN37] The problem with these types of relationships is that they
compromise the director's objectivity. They create a bond with company management that makes it
more difficult to review management's actions objectively and dispassionately. That is likely what
happened to the Enron directors; the *502 relationships they had with company management created a
comfort level that made it possible for them to explain away or to miss completely the various warning
signs before them. Their lack of independence did not necessarily make them bad actors, only much
less sensitive ones. They were proximate monitors, but without independence from the management
they were responsible for monitoring, they were wholly ineffective.
The failings of Enron's directors, however, should not suggest that proximate monitors can never be
effective, or that reliance on the "objective" outside monitor is more appropriate. They failed not
because of their proximity, but because of their lack of independence. Had they been both truly
independent from management, and significant equity holders in the company, the Enron tale might
have had a less dramatic and devastating conclusion. The lesson of Enron is not that proximate
monitors are generally ineffective. Rather, it is that for proximate monitors to be inspired and to
successfully protect shareholder value, they must have both independence and substantial equity
holdings. Only then will we have created the kind of management monitioringthat inspires public
confidence and investment in the corporate enterprise.
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